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condemning corruption.
14 Social contractarians tell businesspeople that they should not pay bribes. 15 At the macro level, consequentialist discussions abound in accounts of corruption at the national and international level. 16 Indeed, many observers attribute the shift in the global legal community's willingness to discuss corruption to the transformation of that conversation from a moral discourse to one that emphasizes economic consequences; 17 Nii Lante Wallace-Bruce describes the shift "from the moral argument to the economic one" as "a masterstroke." 18 Scholars such as Susan Rose-Ackerman, Johann Lambsdorff, and Robert Klitgaard have thoroughly and convincingly marshaled together research that demonstrates the impediment to economic growth, degradation of social and political institutions, misallocation of resources and skills, impoverishment, and numerous other societal ills that corruption inflicts on polities and economies. 19 As Steven Salbu points out, "no nation can miss the clear and highly publicized conclusion that corruption is economically devastating." (2009) . Spicer does not take issue with Donaldson and Dunfee's framework; rather, he uses their extensive analysis of corruption, which goes beyond simply finding corruption an illegitimate violation of a hypernorm, as an opening for his own exploration of the authenticity of local norms regarding corruption. Id. at 837. 15 See, e.g., Dunfee & Donaldson, supra note 13, at 74. Donaldson and Dunfee acknowledge that in some instances the admonition to not pay bribes is an incomplete solution and recommend a longer-term approach that combines "business pressure, legal enforcement, and political will." DONALDSON & DUNFEE, supra note 12, at 230 . 16 See Kaufman, supra note 2, at 41 (noting that the majority of corruption research is empirical studies of its effects). 19 See, e.g., ROBERT KLITGAARD, CONTROLLING CORRUPTION 38-48 (1988) (discussing and explaining the manners in which corruption causes misallocations of goods and services, the generation of negative externalities, inefficiencies, distortion of incentives, the creation of corrupt rents, popular alienation and disenfranchisement, distortions in administration and bureaucracy, and public outrage, at the societal level); JOHANN GRAF LAMBSDORFF, THE INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS OF CORRUPTION AND REFORM: THEORY, EVIDENCE AND POLICY 58-134 (2007) (discussing voluminous empirical research on the damage at the societal level by corruption, developing new models to explain the relationships between corruption and societal damage, and developing and testing a model to show that corruption is not simply a transfer of rents); SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES AND REFORM 9-26 (1999) (discussing and explaining how corruption leads to regulatory distortion and evasion, the entanglement of government and organized crime, market distortion and inefficiency, bureaucratic distortion and malfeasance, systemic degradation, and the delegitimization of and disengagement from government).
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Philosophers, theologists, and ethicists have clearly demonstrated the deontological and social contract proscriptions on bribery at both the macro and micro levels; economists and other social scientists have demonstrated the destructive consequences that bribery inflicts at the macro level. Why then is bribery "universally disapproved yet universally present"? 21 The absence within the literature of a systematic analysis at the firm level of the consequences of breaching bribery rules, in the tradition of Rose-Ackerman, Lambsdorff, or Klitgaard, could contribute to the persistence of bribery. From the individual businessperson's perspective, questions remain regarding the business case for complying with bribery laws. This article seeks to fill that gap.
There is a dearth of firm-level empirical data on the consequences of paying bribes. In the last decade, however, some scholars have conducted firm-level inquiries; their findings, combined with theoretical discussions of corruption and with the regulatory environment, allow for a reasonable discussion of the consequences at the firm level of paying bribes. Moreover, a survey of local laws and of international corruption regimes demonstrates the contingent legal liabilities for the payment of bribes. A very strong business case exists for complying with the rules regarding bribery.
This article first clarifies the definitions of bribery and corruption. The article then examines direct and indirect costs of paying bribes 22 and the effect of corruption on potential relationships. 23 Finally, the article discusses potential criminal liability, particularly in light of the expansive international legal regime. 24 The totality of these costs and liabilities strongly suggest that the consequences for any given firm of paying a bribe would burden rather than benefit the firm.
I. DEFINITIONS AND MODES OF ANALYSIS OF CORRUPTION

A. Definitions
Corruption engenders complicated definitional and philosophical debates. 25 This article uses the most common definition of corruption: abuse or misuse of a position of trust or responsibility for private gain rather than the purpose for which that trust or responsibility was conferred. . 21 Hess & Dunfee, supra note 3, at 595. 22 See infra Part II. 23 See infra Part III. 24 See infra Part IV. 25 Arnold Heidenheimer suggests three broad categories of attempts to define public sector corruption: public officecentered, moral and public interest-centered, and market-based types of definitions. ARNOLD J. 27 This article deals primarily with the form of corruption known as bribery. Bribery consists of a transaction in which a person abuses or misuses a position of trust or responsibility, quid pro quo something of value. 28 Unfortunately, a great deal of the literature on corruption and bribery conflates the two terms, and many of the studies referred to in this article use the term "corruption" even though they examine bribery. 29 This article tries to, but cannot always, avoid confusion of terms when referring to these studies.
Corruption and bribery can exist in interactions between firms and government or in interactions solely among private firms. 30 Most of the research discussed in this article takes account of interactions between firms and government. Private sector corruption-corruption in interactions between private firms-probably imposes tremendous costs on firms as well, and also merits serious scholarly attention. 31 Good reasons exist, however, for the focus by scholars on public sector corruption. At the simplest level, scholars have access to more data concerning public sector corruption. Public sector corruption also preoccupies scholars because it implicates the viability of fundamental social institutions. 32 Most of the lessons discerned from an examination of public sector bribery, however, translate to bribery in any interaction.
B. Dynamic Versus Static Analysis
which defines corruption as "the abuse of entrusted power for private gain," Frequently Asked Questions About Corruption, TRANSPARENCY INT'L, http://www.transparency.org/news_room/faq/corruption_faq (last visited Oct. 1, 2011), and the World Bank, which defines corruption as "the abuse of public office for private gain," World Bank Grp., Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of the World Bank, WORLD BANK, http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/corruptn/cor02.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2011) (emphasis removed). This definition allows for a general discussion of corruption; the legality or illegality of a particular action depends on the precise wording of the criminal laws of a government having jurisdiction over that action. 27 To understand corruption, one must evaluate its effects dynamically rather than statically. Much of the older "grease money" literature suggested that, in an overly bureaucratized system, corruption allowed business firms to bypass bureaucracy and therefore lowered costs for those firms. 33 These analyses conceived of corruption as exogenous to the relationship between a firm and the bureaucracy. 34 According to this analysis, each bribe affects only that particular transaction: the background condition of corruption is not affected by the bribe, and bribes are not affected by the background condition of corruption.
Scholars with experience in corruption, however, describe corruption as dynamically involved with those bureaucracies. Susan Rose-Ackerman, a groundbreaking scholar on the political economy of corruption, addresses the exogenous perception of corruption head on: "I disagree. . . . [T] he authors [who suggest that routine corruption may confer benefits] assume that officials have only limited discretion. For example, the tax collector 'discovers' the tax liabilities of citizens and firms. In reality, he or she might 'create' tax liabilities as a bribe extraction device." 35 Field observation strongly supports Rose-Ackerman's argument. In the 1980s, Robert Wade described the relationships between rice farmers in southern India and officials of the Irrigation Department. 36 He observed that, among other things, bureaucrats hid information, delayed action, and obfuscated rules and facts so that they could leverage ever larger bribes from farmers who needed water. 37 Salim Rashid observed the degradation of a telephone system in India as bureaucrats created ever longer delays so that they could extract ever larger bribes. 38 By the 1990s, scholars generally agreed that dynamic analysis provides more accurate descriptions of the effects of corruption than does static analysis. 39 Dynamic analysis recognizes the "intertemporal linkages" between decisions: "decisions made today affect those to be made in the future." 40 Scholars also agreed that a dynamic analysis generally indicated that over time the costs of corruption generally outweigh any benefits. 41 
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Businesspeople instinctively recognize the dynamic effects of corruption, even if they do not always act rationally based on that recognition. Businesspeople recognize that one can earn a reputation as a dishonest actor or a corrupt business; earning a reputation takes time and occurs over several interactions. The qualitative literature on corruption overflows with accounts from businesspeople of the costs accumulated over time associated with the reputational effects of paying bribes. 42 Two very experienced transnational corporate lawyers describe the experience of businesses in strong terms:
[W]hen a company first agrees to pay bribes, it is immediately tainted with a reputation for corruption that is virtually impossible to shake. Virtue, once lost, is rarely ever regained. One payment quickly becomes two, then four, and so on. The smell of corruption attracts other would-be bribees like flies, all of whom exert their leverage by threatening to report previous transgressions. 43 Elizabeth Spahn adds, simply, "The bribe price goes up." 44 Daniel Kaufman and Shang-Jin Wei suggest dynamic analysis of corruption at the firm level. 45 They develop a theoretical model that looks beyond the effects of a single transaction. They base their model on a Stackelberg "game between a rent-seeking government official and a representative firm," and then use backward induction to solve for the equilibrium level of official harassment and cost of time spent with government officials. 46 Their model predicts that "firms that pay more bribes not only face a higher nominal rate of harassment in equilibrium, but also have to deal with a higher effective rate of harassment."
47 They therefore predict, based on this model, that in the real world firms that pay bribes will bear more, not less, costs due to 42 See ALEXANDRA ADDISON WRAGE, BRIBERY AND EXTORTION: UNDERMINING BUSINESS, GOVERNMENTS, AND SECURITY 31 (2007) ("Representatives of multinational companies operating overseas describe a consistent trend. When these companies pay bribes to resolve some short-term nuisance, they report that the bribe-taker returns, the word spreads, and the demands multiply. 8 bureaucratic interference. 48 Kaufman and Wei's model suggests what many businesspeople already know: the dynamic effects of corruption apply at the firm level as well as at the country or regional level. These direct and indirect costs imposed on the firm are discussed in the next section of this article.
II. ENGAGING IN BRIBERY INCREASES DIRECT COSTS AND INDIRECT COSTS
Very few-if any-firms pay bribes in order to enhance the well being of the bribe-taking government official. Firms pay bribes in hopes of obtaining a business advantage, such as lower costs, greater efficiencies, or access to relationships or markets. 49 A simplistic, static analysis of a bribe request might suggest that payment of a bribe could accrue an advantage. More sophisticated analysis, however, suggests the opposite; empirical evidence also indicates that corrupt behavior imposes costs on a firm.
A. Bribery Increases Direct Costs
The most starkly demonstrated cost imposed by paying bribes is time spent dealing with bureaucracy. This may seem counterintuitive, particularly given slang terms for bribes such as "speed money."
50 Understanding corruption as a dynamic process, however, casts light on the cost imposed by bribery. Corruption creates a relationship, perhaps between the bribe payer and a bribe-taking official, but certainly between the bribe payer and the bureaucracy. 51 Power resides asymmetrically in the parties: the official has control over a resource or service desired by the firm, whereas the firm only has money. 52 The official acts as an agent of the state for purposes of controlling the resource or service but acts out of self-interest when disbursing them, and thus is not well-constrained by the strictures of responsibility to the state; indeed, market forces may form a more powerful constraint on a corrupt bureaucrat's behavior. 53 The firm has 48 Id. 53 Ritva Reinikka and Jakob Svensson observed these market forces in operation: "These results suggest that public officials act as price (bribe) discriminators, demanding higher bribes (for a given public service) from firms that can afford to pay, and demanding lower bribes from firms that credibly can threaten to exit the market or use other means to acquire the service. already indicated a willingness to pay an illicit fee in order to avoid bureaucratic delay or to secure administrative approval; nothing exists to prevent the official from creating new and greater delays or from simply renegotiating the size of the illicit fee. Jay Pil Choi and Marcel Thum label this process the "ratchet effect" of corruption.
54
Choi and Thum join Kaufman and Wei in developing theoretical models to describe the costs associated with the ratchet effect. Kaufman and Wei go on to test their theory regarding direct costs against empirical evidence. Using data from several thousands of responses to surveys conducted for the Global Competitiveness Report and the World Development Report, 55 holding other factors constant, and comparing bribe-paying and non-bribe-paying firms within the same countries, Kaufman and Wei find that "firms that pay more bribes, in equilibrium, experience more, not less, time wasted with the officials on matters related to regulations." 56 The same is true when firms of similar size and other characteristics are compared. 57 The same is true when comparing only companies operating in Asia. 58 The same is true when different data sets are analyzed. 59 Firms that pay bribes spend more, not less, time and money in dealing with government.
Other empirical studies corroborate and amplify these findings. Alejandro Gaviria, for example, applies a slightly different model to firm-level data from Latin America and still finds-when directly comparing firms that pay bribes to firms that do not pay bribes-that the payment of bribes increases rather than lowers costs for an individual firm.
60 Jakob Svensson, using very detailed firm-level data from Uganda, finds no evidence for the "grease money" hypothesis but does find that paying bribes damages firm operations. 61 Donato De Rosa, Nishaal Gooroochurn, and Holger Görg explicitly test, at the firm level, the hypothesis that bribery acts as "grease" that allows firms to escape burdensome regulation.
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They find no empirical evidence to support that hypothesis. 63 De Rosa, Gooroochurn, and Görg's study also yielded two additional empirical observations quite pertinent to a business case 54 55 Kaufman & Wei, supra note 45, at 5-6. 56 Id. at 10; see also id. at 12 (" [F] irms that report paying more bribes also spend more time negotiating with the bureaucracies . . . ."). 57 See id. at 9-10, 12. 58 See id. at 10. Kaufman to not pay bribes. They compare the costs imposed on a firm by the payment of bribes to the costs imposed by lengthy bureaucratic processes. 64 They find that the payment of bribes imposed real and significant costs on firms, but that-contrary to almost any prediction-the bureaucratic delay experienced by firms not paying bribes did not impose significant costs. 65 They also find that the costs imposed on firms by paying bribes were greater in countries that experienced higher background levels of corruption. 66 In other words, even though a firm might operate in a country where corruption seems "normal," that firm would still accrue costs rather than benefits by paying bribes when compared to firms that do not pay bribes.
Kaufman and Wei also examined the cost of acquiring capital. In many countries bureaucrats can exert considerable control over the flow of capital. 67 If bribes do in fact facilitate government action, then firms that pay bribes should obtain capital at lower costs. In fact, Kaufman and Wei found the opposite to be true: "firms that have paid more bribes also have a higher, not lower, cost of capital." 68 In general, corruption increases the cost of raising capital through bonds and decreases the value of equity. 69 Paying bribes increases costs as well as the amount of time spent interacting with bureaucrats. These consequences alone create a strong business case against the payment of bribes. High direct costs, however, are not the only consequences of the payment of bribes.
B. Bribery Lowers Rates of Growth
Empirical studies indicate that firms that pay bribes experience lower rates of growth. Raymond Fisman and Jakob Svensson compare, at the firm level, the effect of the payment of bribes and the payment of taxes on firm growth. 70 Fisman and Svensson use firm-level data from firms in several industries in Uganda. 71 They recognize that the apparent relationship between the payment of bribes and growth can be deceptive because high-growth or high-profit firms may choose to pay or be targeted for the payment of higher bribes. 72 They therefore develop a model to factor out growth factors endogenous to corruption and compare firms with comparable characteristics. 73 They find "robust evidence that higher corruption is associated with lower firm growth."
74 Specifically, they find that a one percent increase in the rate of bribery "is associated with a reduction in firm growth of more than three percentage points."
75 Intriguingly, they also find that the payment of bribes is three times more damaging to growth than payment of an equivalent amount of taxes. 76 These findings specifically include short-term growth.
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Alejandro Gaviria does not examine the effect of paying bribes on general firm growth; rather, he examines at the firm level the effect of paying bribes on the growth of sales. 78 He uses survey data from more than twenty countries across Latin America.
79 Like Fisman and Svensson, Gaviria distinguishes his study from other research on the relationship between corruption and performance by engaging in firm-level analysis, factoring out other conditions that might affect comparative growth in sales. 80 As an empirical matter, Gaviria finds that the payment of bribes does not lead to more sales growth but in fact actually lowers sales growth.
81
More generally, he also finds that the payment of bribes lowers investment and employment growth, which suggests lower overall growth.
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None of these findings support an argument that bribery confers an advantage. Indeed, these studies suggest that the payment of bribes renders a firm less competitive. Lower rates of growth could in part be attributed to the additional costs accrued through paying bribes. Lower rates of sales growth, however, strongly suggest a negative dynamic effect of bribery: the payment of a bribe leads to more interference and more demands for bribes, igniting a vicious circle in which the payment of more bribes leads to demands for more bribes rather than to bureaucratic transparency and facilitation.
C. Bribery Is Related to Lower Productivity
"Productivity," in general, has to do with output per factor; 83 at the firm level one important measure has to do with the efficient relationship between capital and labor. 84 No empiricist has conducted firm-level research on the extent to which paying bribes affects productivity. Johann Graf Lambsdorff has, however, studied the effects of corruption on firm productivity through 73 See id. at 66-67. 74 Svensson, supra note 61, at 320. 75 85 Lambsdorff predicts that corruption will decrease productivity because corruption distorts decision making, allocation of resources, and the creation of relationships.
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Empirical analysis supports this prediction. Lambsdorff finds that corruption significantly reduces productivity: a ten percent increase in the average amount of corruption experienced by firms in the aggregate reduces productivity by two percent. 87 Using Tanzania and the United Kingdom as examples, he finds that if Tanzanian firms experienced the levels of corruption experienced by British firms, total output of the Tanzanian firms would increase by twenty percent.
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Ernesto Dal Bó and Martín Rossi conduct a similar study, still comparing firms in the aggregate but comparing only firms within a single industry (electric utility companies) and a single region (Latin America).
89 Dal Bó and Rossi predict that bribery inhibits growth because "in a corrupt environment the fate of a firm is not tightly related to managerial efforts devoted to supervising and coordinating the use of productive factors."
90 Turning to the empirical data, they too find a strong association between experience with corruption and less productive use of capital.
91 They too use countries to illustrate the magnitude of the effect; their research indicates that if electric utilities in Brazil experienced corruption only to the extent that companies in Costa Rica experienced corruption, those utilities would use seven percent fewer workers to provide the same amount of electricity that they provide today.
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Lower productivity again demonstrates the dynamic effect of bribery and corruption. A firm that pays bribes becomes embroiled in a relationship in which it is to the bureaucrat's advantage to create delays and obstacles that the firm must then pay to have removed. Moreover, the firm may have no easy route for exit from this relationship. As Elizabeth Spahn points out, the bureaucrat has a strong incentive to maintain the relationship and can release embarrassing or incriminating information about the firm if the firm attempts to leave the relationship. 91 See id. at 958. 92 
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III. PAYING BRIBES NEGATIVELY AFFECTS RELATIONSHIPS
Id.
93 See Spahn, supra note 44, at 888-89. Spahn suggests that, in extreme situations, "drive-by shootings are a possible exit strategy for unwanted partners." Id. at 889 (commenting specifically on experiences of Western business representatives in Russia). Her wry observation underscores the lack of transparent institutions to mediate the relationship between the bribe-paying firm and the bribe-accepting public official.
Bribery's effect on time, money, growth, and productivity is a product of the dynamic relationship between a bribe-paying firm and a bribe-taking public official. Bribery also diminishes relationships other than the relationship between the firm and the public official, and its effect on those relationships can impose indirect costs on a firm. Bribery affects both internal and external relationships; this article discusses each in turn.
A. Bribery Damages Internal Relationships
The payment of bribes creates a workplace in which employees are more likely to steal materials or opportunities from the employer. Many factors contribute to a decision by an employee to engage in misconduct. 94 The firm's "ethical climate," however, sends very powerful signals to employees about appropriate and acceptable behaviors.
95 Bart Victor and John Cullen created an early typography of ethical climates, describing them as self-interested, benevolent, or principled. 96 David Fritzsche points out that these three categories reflect three dominant categories of ethical frameworks: egoism, utilitarianism, and deontology. 97 Others have subsequently offered more nuanced categories. 98 Regardless of the schema used, the fact that a firm's organizational climate can create an environment of self-serving, egoistic behavior constitutes the salient insight. 99 Behaviors engaged in, condoned by, or rewarded by managers play a large role in creating the ethical environment. Large firms seeking to enhance the ethical quality of their enterprises are advised to set the tone from the top. 100 The same is patently true of small firms; in a survey of small enterprise professionals, "[t]he majority of respondents reported that top management set the ethical tone for the organization and had the most influence on unethical 94 decisions." 101 Rule-breaking behavior by managers, therefore, creates a workplace environment in which employees consider self-serving behaviors acceptable.
Empirical studies have directly linked the payment of bribes by firms to self-serving misbehaviors by employees. In controlled laboratory experiments, participants who were rewarded by supervisors for cheating by offering bribes during games were more likely than other participants to engage in self-serving behaviors. 102 A survey of municipal office workers found that the single greatest factor contributing to self-serving behavior was the observation of bribe-taking by managers. 103 Indeed, mere exposure to the tolerance of bribe-giving in a firm has been found to significantly contribute to self-serving misbehavior. 104 Conversely, studies of South African firms in which purchasing departments adhered to high standards of conduct found that a strong and shared ethical climate constituted a critical element in the departments' good performances. 105 Self-serving misbehavior imposes very burdensome costs on firms. Kickbacks, for example, rob firms of discounts or other savings that should accrue to the firm or burden the firm with shoddy goods and services. 106 Workplace theft and fraud impose even greater costs. "The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners . . . has reported that the typical U.S. firm loses six percent of its annual revenues to employee fraud." 107 This translates to almost seven hundred billion U.S. dollars lost each year to employee misconduct. 108 Worldwide data is difficult to obtain, but the numbers that are available depict a staggering problem. Employee theft-a subset of employee misconduct-imposes serious costs; by one estimate employee theft costs firms around the world over one hundred billion dollars each year. 109 Chinese firms lose over nineteen billion U.S. dollars to employee theft alone; 110 even Australian and New Zealand firms lose almost a billion dollars each year. 111 These hits to the bottom line have profound and tangible effects: "The U.S. Chamber of Commerce estimates that . . . 30% of corporate bankruptcies are a direct result of employee theft."
112
Empiricists who study the connection between firm bribery and self-serving misbehavior by employees reach consensus on the means to reduce the harmful misbehavior inside the firm: managers should stop paying or tolerating the payment of bribes to parties outside of the firm.
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Those bribes create an environment in which employees are more likely to consider self-serving misbehavior appropriate. The actions, such as office theft, which are associated with an environment in which people consider self-serving misbehavior to be appropriate constitute a significant cost associated with the paying bribes.
B. Bribery Damages or Precludes External Relationships
The payment of a bribe could affect relationships with a potential customer of goods or services. Little empirical research exists to show the extent to which this happens, but at least two aspects of this consequence merit attention.
First, to the extent that customers include members of the general public, in most countries that public despises corruption. Survey after survey demonstrates that even in countries experiencing endemic corruption people dislike the practice and understand the harm it inflicts on their society. Sahr John Kapundeh, for example, found that even while Sierra Leone suffered myriad nation-threatening crises, respondents to his survey singled corruption out for particular condemnation. 114 Peru, 117 Romania, 118 and South Asia, 119 as well as students in Bulgaria, Mongolia, 120 and Russia. 121 Anecdotal evidence suggests that after the collapse of the corrupt Suharto regime in Indonesia, firms that collaborated with Suharto had difficulty marketing within Indonesia. 122 Firms should recognize the possibility of damage to relationships with the broad pool of potential customers, even though the damage is inchoate.
Second, the payment of bribes definitively precludes relationships with a growing number of specific customers. Most international financial institutions, as well as many governments, maintain lists of suppliers and consultants debarred from contracts or projects due to involvement in corruption. 123 The World Bank, for example, not only debars firms and consultants who have acted corruptly in association with a World Bank project, but it also debars firms and consultants that have been debarred by the Asian Development Bank and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 124 China excludes corrupt actors from government projects, 125 as does the United States. 126 Exclusion from custom with these institutions and governments is not inconsequential; these bodies are involved in trillions of dollars of projects each year. 127 Firms that pay bribes also severely constrict the number of foreign parties with whom they can form other relationships. Several empirical studies have found that foreign investors avoid corrupt countries in general. Paolo Mauro conducted one of the earliest of these studies. 128 He finds a "negative association between corruption and [foreign] investment, as well as growth, [that] is significant in both a statistical and an economic sense." 129 Numerous studies, using differing methodologies and sets of data, corroborate Mauro's findings. Victor M. Gastanaga, Jeffrey B. Nugent, and Bistra Pashamova, for example, examine corruption and other possible inhibitors of foreign investment in the context of the effects of government reforms and find that corruption diminishes foreign investment. 130 Beata K. Smarzynska and Shang-Jin Wei use a finer data set, analyze from a firm level, focus particularly on the effects inside emerging economies, and find that "more corruption in a host country is associated with a lower probability of [foreign] investment." 131 Mohsin Habib and Leon Zurawicki find that corruption inhibits foreign investment but also find that the effect is amplified as the distance grows between the level of corruption in the host country and the home country of the investor. 132 In other words, a firm located in a country with relatively high levels of corruption faces obstacles in forming investment relationships with foreign parties, and even greater obstacles creating investment relationships with foreign parties who are themselves not prone to act corruptly.
Many reasons probably explain the decision at the individual firm level to resist forming investment relationships in relatively more corrupt countries. Corrupt relationships, as has been discussed in this article, impose direct costs; rational investors would choose to avoid those costs. 133 Corruption creates an environment of opacity, obfuscation, and delay, which often repels potential investors. 134 Corruption creates uncertainty and instability, which discourages investment. 135 All of these studies and observations treat the potential investment destination in the aggregate. An individual firm located in a country with a relatively high level of corruption might think that because all potential investment partners outside of its country face these generic difficulties regardless of whether that particular company pays bribes, paying bribes will not cause further negative consequences. Such reasoning, of course, is not correct: at the local level a firm that pays bribes has greater costs and uses resources less effectively, and it would probably be unattractive to a foreign firm on that basis alone. Regardless, one factor that repels foreign relationships does so at the firm level and absolutely flows from the actions of the individual firm: liability.
The next section of this article discusses criminal liability as a consequence of the payment of a bribe. Criminal liability for the payment of bribes can be severe. 136 Firms understandably seek to avoid those penalties and seek to avoid relationships that will expose them to liability. Indeed, a survey of international businesses commissioned by Deloitte found that in one year nearly two-thirds of those firms had abandoned projects involving the creation of an international relationship due to concerns over potential liability for the payment of bribes. 137 A great number of relationships can create such exposure.
The United States' Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 138 imposes criminal liability for the payment or offer of bribes to foreign officials. As it is one of the older laws imposing such liability, it serves well as an illustration of the extent to which relationships with corrupt actors can extend liability. 139 The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act generally extends jurisdiction over U.S. firms and individuals for their own actions.
140 U.S. entities can, however, also be held liable for the actions of parties with whom they have certain relationships. When a U.S. firm acquires, merges with, or in some cases even acquires the assets of a foreign firm, it also assumes exposure for criminal liability for bribes that that foreign firm has paid. 141 Parent companies can often be found criminally liable for bribes paid by subsidiaries, on the theory that the parent is aware or constructively aware of the bribe; 142 U.S. firms can even be found liable for bribes paid by foreign firms in which they own large percentages of shares. 143 Parent companies can be held criminally liable for bribes paid by agents of subsidiaries.
144 U.S. firms are criminally liable for bribes paid by employees or agents. 145 U.S. firms are also liable for bribes paid by any third party or intermediary acting on behalf of the U.S. firm. 146 Justin Marceau predicts that U.S. franchisors will be found criminally liable, when constructive knowledge can be established, for bribes paid by foreign franchisees. 147 Debra Maryanov points out that because the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act imposes criminal liability for payments to third parties if the U.S. firm knows or constructively knows that some or all of that payment will be used to pay a bribe, then U.S. firms can be held criminally liable for payments made to suppliers if they constructively know that those suppliers use part of the payment to fund bribes. 148 Given the severe criminal liability that can accrue simply from entering into a relationship with a bribe payer, U.S. firms are advised to be extremely cautious about entering into relationships.
149 U.S. firms are not alone. Most of the major trading countries in the world have enacted similar legislation. 150 As just one example, the German Criminal Code states that 20 "[w]hoever commits the crime himself or through another shall be punished as a perpetrator." 151 Germany has explicitly warned that this provision will be used to hold German companies liable for bribes paid by related parties outside of Germany. 152 Bulgaria imposes administrative rather than criminal liability on artificial persons. 153 The actions of employees, agents, representatives, or firms to which the Bulgarian firm has a connection expose Bulgarian firms to administrative liability;
154 Bulgaria has made clear that this liability extends to the payment of bribes. 155 These are but two examples of the general point: business firms expose themselves to risk when they enter into relationships with firms that pay bribes, which engenders reluctance on the part of those firms to enter into relationships with firms that pay bribes.
When, therefore, a firm pays a bribe, it precludes itself from entering into relationships with a vast number of transnational entities. Precluding these relationships is not inconsequential. The extent to which a relationship with a foreign business will benefit any particular firm depends on complex interactions of idiosyncratic characteristics. 156 In general, however, relationships with foreign entities often represent the most effective means of acquiring new machineries or technologies, 157 developing and implementing management and governance skills, 158 creating broader networks of relationships, 159 and accessing capital. 160 A firm that pays bribes risks cutting itself off from factors that will allow it to grow and to flourish in the future.
IV. CRIMINAL LIABILITY
When considering the consequences of paying a bribe, a person or firm must take into account the potential for criminal sanction. 161 Criminal sanctions adhere to bribery through at least two frameworks: through local laws and through laws sanctioning the bribery of foreign public officials. Not every jurisdiction imposes criminal liability on legal persons, although a growing number of countries do so. 162 This article speaks generally of criminal liability and tries to include both real persons and firms when it is appropriate to do so.
A. Local Law
Virtually every country in the world criminalizes the bribery of its own officials. 163 Albania, for example, prohibits payments to a government official "to have him act or refrain from acting on an action connected to his duty or service, or to use his influence toward other authorities in order to insure favors, courtesies and any other benefits."
164 Zambia, more verbosely, imposes criminal penalties on [a] ny person who by himself, or by or in conjunction with any other person, corruptly gives, promises or offers any gratification to any public officer, whether for the benefit of that public officer or of any other public officer, as an inducement or reward for doing or forbearing to do, anything in relation to any matter or transaction, actual or proposed, with which any public body is or may be concerned. 166 Alphabetically (in English), Afghanistan precedes Albania and Zimbabwe follows Zambia; each of these countries, however, is experiencing profound change and their laws may be in a state of flux. Nonetheless, both criminalize bribery. Afghanistan for the moment still uses a penal code enacted in 1976. See PENAL CODE, OFFICIAL GAZETTE NO. 347 (Afg.). Chapter Three of that code lays out extensive provisions regarding bribery. The law prohibits giving or promising to give "any money, good or other benefit . . . for the purpose of performance of or abstention from or disruption of a duty which is assigned to him." Arts. 254-55. Afghan law also prohibits an interesting version of bribery: "A person who forces an official of public services though oral or material pressure to do an unrightful work, or hinders the performance of his job obligation or disrupts it, shall be considered as briber and shall be sentenced to its fixed punishment." Art. 257. As part of the nation-building process in Afghanistan, Some countries do not enforce these laws with vigor, which may lead some firms to believe that the risk of prosecution equals zero. Such thinking grossly miscalculates the risk. In general, current failure to enforce a given law does not drain that law of its legal vitality. 167 Prosecution for violation of a generally unenforced statute always remains a possibility. 168 Indeed, aggressive prosecutors can use rarely enforced laws to target or harass people or firms for which they have some degree of animus. 169 Historically, prosecutors have used corruption laws to target persons or entities. 170 There is good reason to be especially sensitive to the possibility of prosecution for payment of a bribe. Laws sometimes lapse into unenforced status because they no longer, or never did, align with underlying social norms. 171 These statutes are left in criminal codes because the transaction costs of removing them exceed the burden imposed on the general public 172 of leaving them in the codes. 173 Prosecutorial discretion aligns the lack of enforcement with extant norms, which minimizes the public's impulses to repeal these laws. 174 The opposite is true of bribery laws. Rather than functioning to accurately reflect extant norms, the lack of enforcement of bribery laws occurs because of a malfunction in the legal process. 175 The general public deeply despises corruption and perceives the failure to enforce corruption laws as a problem. 176 The nonenforcement of bribery laws, therefore, occurs due to a malfunction of the process of law; to the extent that the quality of law improves or a different malfunction occurs, then the likelihood of prosecutions of bribery should change and the risk of criminal punishment could increase substantially.
The penalties imposed for bribery vary but generally involve imprisonment and fines. Some countries impose the death penalty for bribery.
177 Albania, referenced above, imposes an unspecified fine and imprisonment of up to five years;
178 Zambia requires disgorgement of the benefit and imposes a prison sentence of up to twelve years.
179 Table 1 outlines the criminal penalties for simple bribery 180 of domestic public officials in polities that are among the twenty most active in international trade or are among the twenty greatest destinations for inward foreign investment 181 -in other words, countries with which an international businessperson is most likely to interact. 231 The number of years a person may spend in prison for paying a bribe varies in different jurisdictions, as does the amount of money a firm may pay as a fine. In some jurisdictions an actor may perceive the risk of detection and prosecution as low. The risk, however, is never zero and a firm contemplating paying a bribe must always understand that criminal sanction is a potential consequence.
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foreign officials in order to seek an unjust commercial benefit. 249 The law applies to natural and legal persons, including joint ventures. Penalties for violations of this law include imprisonment for up to ten years as well as fines. 250 China has not yet had time to demonstrate the vigor with which it will enforce this law; the central government of China, however, has in general demonstrated a commitment to prosecuting corruption cases. 251 Many of the laws criminalizing bribery of foreign officials have broader jurisdictional application than even that of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Hungary, for example, not only extends jurisdiction to bribes paid within Hungary's territory or by Hungarian citizens and companies abroad, 252 but it also may prosecute nonnationals for the payment (or receipt) of bribes if the conduct is a crime in the place where it occurred. 253 In other words, Hungary's courts may extend jurisdiction over a person who pays a bribe to a foreign official almost any place in the world, regardless of any substantial connection to Hungary. 254 Iceland extends jurisdiction to acts that have a substantial connection to the territory of Iceland, but will also prosecute a person apprehended on the territory of Iceland even if the bribe had no connection to Iceland. 255 At the discretion of the King, the antibribery law of Norway can be extended to nonNorwegian nationals for acts committed entirely outside of Norway. 256 The breadth of behaviors prohibited by many of these laws also exceeds that of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. The Act, for example, famously exempts "facilitating payments" (bribes paid to secure nondiscretionary government actions). 257 The same is not true of myriad other laws that criminalize bribes paid to foreign officials. 258 Mexico, for example, does not provide an exception for facilitating payments, 259 nor does Luxembourg 260 or Japan. 261 The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act applies only to bribes paid to obtain or retain business; many international anti-bribery enforcement is increasing worldwide, as more countries move slowly from enacting anti-bribery laws to initiating actions to identify and prosecute the individuals and companies who break them." 275 The global trend toward vigorous enforcement of antibribery laws brings with it the possibility of overlapping jurisdiction. 276 A hypothetical U.S national working for a manufacturing branch located in China of a Singaporean and German joint venture with a significant market presence in Britain who paid a bribe to an Indonesian government official while at a meeting in South Korea would be subject to liability under each of the criminal laws of Germany, Indonesia, the People's Republic of China, Singapore, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and the United States. If she tried to flee on Icelandic Airlines she would be subject to arrest and prosecution during the layover in Reykjavik. Wherever she went in the world, she would be subject to prosecution by Hungary. This hypothetical is designed to illustrate the potential for extensive overlap, but it is far from fanciful. Stephen Kobrin, among others, writes of the post-Westphalian business reality, in which businesses form multiple chains of relationships with little regard for political borders. 277 A firm that pays a bribe is subject to punishment by each of the states that can claim jurisdiction over that act, and those claims may be plentiful. When considering the consequences of paying a bribe, a firm must include the possibility of multiple criminal prosecutions.
CONCLUSION
The rules regarding bribery are clear at both the macro and the micro levels: individuals and firms may not pay bribes. Scholars have also examined the consequences of bribery at the macro level, and that research has been marshaled together in a comprehensive manner: the consequences can be devastating. However, although empirical and theoretical research has been conducted at the micro level, that research has not been marshaled together in the same way. The lack of a comprehensive overview of the firm-and individual-level consequences of paying bribes perhaps contributes to the continued payment of bribes by firms even though the rules clearly prohibit those bribes. The failure of scholarship to discuss the consequences at the micro level could also be interpreted as the failure to state a business case for not paying bribes.
This article provides a comprehensive overview of the likely or potential outcomes that flow from paying bribes. The payment of bribes initiates a dynamic relationship between the bribe payer and a bureaucracy. That relationship, as well as the bribe itself, engenders consequences. In general, the payment of bribes increases the costs borne by a firm and increases the amount of time that firm will spend interacting with bureaucracies. The firm is likely to experience lower rates of growth and lower productivity than firms that do not pay bribes. The firm that pays bribes will be debarred from participating in a number of lucrative projects and will not be able to enter into beneficial relationships with transnational actors. Individuals in the firm, as well as the firm itself, expose themselves to criminal prosecution, fines, and imprisonment. The expansive international legal regime increases the likelihood that the bribepayer has violated multiple laws and bears potential liability in multiple jurisdictions.
From a scholarly perspective, the research on consequences at the micro level complements the research on consequences at the macro level. Bribery imposes costs on the firm or the individual and degrades relationships in which that firm or individual is involved. From the perspective of an actual business or businessperson, the research as a whole presents a strong business case for complying with rules that prohibit the payment of bribes and for developing programs and policies that ensure compliance with laws prohibiting the payment of bribes. Firms that develop and implement such programs and thereby avoid paying bribes should also avoid the costs imposed by the payment of bribes and enjoy an advantage over firms that continue to pay bribes.
